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BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JOEL SCOTT THORNE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 44112
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2015-7845
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, twenty-year-old Joel Scott Thorne pleaded guilty
to felony injury to children. The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. After receiving a letter from the
deputy warden of one of the retained jurisdiction program facilities where Mr. Thorne
had been placed, reporting Mr. Thorne had committed serious disciplinary offenses, the
district court relinquished jurisdiction. On appeal, Mr. Thorne asserts the district court
abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
K.A., in a CARES interview, reported she had met Mr. Thorne about eight
months before the interview when they had both been at Intermountain Hospital. (See
Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3.)1 K.A. stated she had told Mr. Thorne
she was thirteen, and Mr. Thorne stated he was eighteen. (PSI, p.3.) K.A. stated she
and Mr. Thorne had sexual intercourse three times in the month they met. (PSI, p.3.)
K.A. also described an incident that happened about two days before the CARES
interview. (PSI, p.3.) She reported Mr. Thorne rubbed her leg and buttocks while she
was at his house in Nampa, and Mr. Thorne then engaged in manual-genital contact
with her. (See PSI, pp.3, 32.) K.A. stated she and Mr. Thorne then smoked marijuana
and later had sexual intercourse in his car. (PSI, p.3.)
When the police subsequently interviewed Mr. Thorne, he reportedly admitted to
having sexual intercourse with K.A. about twenty times. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Thorne stated
he was eighteen and K.A. was fourteen at the time of his police interview. (PSI, p.4.)
The State charged Mr. Thorne by Information with injury to children, felony, Idaho
Code § 18-1501(1).

(R., pp.22-23.)

The charge was based on the incident that

reportedly happened about two days before K.A.’s CARES interview. (See R., p.23.)
Mr. Thorne entered a not guilty plea. (R., p.24.)
Mr. Thorne then participated in a psychosexual evaluation. (PSI, pp.52-99; see
Tr., Aug. 27, 2015, p.5, Ls.17-21.)

According to the psychosexual evaluation,

Mr. Thorne “poses a moderate risk to re-offend within the next five to ten years with a

All citations to the “PSI” refer to the 122-page PDF electronic version of the
Presentence Report and its attachments.
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future sexual offense when compared to other sexual offenders.” (PSI, p.95.) The
psychosexual evaluation further stated Mr. Thorne “presented as being in the upper-end
of the moderate risk to re-offend range, meaning if he were to resist treatment or
supervision he should be reconsidered for classification as a high risk to re-offend.”
(PSI, p.95.)
Based on the results of the psychosexual evaluation, the parties entered into a
plea agreement where Mr. Thorne agreed to plead guilty to injury to children.
(R., pp.29-43; Tr., Aug. 27, 2015, p.5, Ls.21-24.) The State agreed to recommend a
retained jurisdiction, and Mr. Thorne would be free to argue for a lesser sentence.
(Tr., Aug. 27, 2015, p.5, L.24 – p.6, L.1.) The underlying sentence would be open for
argument. (Tr., Aug. 27, 2015, p.6, Ls.2-3.) The district court accepted Mr. Thorne’s
guilty plea. (Tr., Aug. 27, 2015, p.28, L.24 – p.29, L.10.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a
unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, and that the district court retain
jurisdiction. (Tr., Oct. 13, 2015, p.6, Ls.3-8.) Mr. Thorne recommended the district
court place him on probation. (Tr., Oct. 13, 2015, p.9, Ls.8-13.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.57-59.) The district court recommended Mr. Thorne’s placement in
a traditional retained jurisdiction program or “rider” with a focus on sex offender
treatment. (R., p.58; Tr., Oct. 13, 2015, p.14, Ls.5-8.)
About four months after the district court retained jurisdiction, Brad Lutz, the
Deputy Warden at North Idaho Correctional Institution (NICI), sent a letter to the district
court recommending the district court relinquish jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.118-19.) The
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letter stated, “[g]iven that Mr. Thorne did not participate in a meaningful program while
on this retained jurisdiction, we are sending this update letter in place of an Addendum
to the Pre-sentence Investigation (APSI).”

(PSI, p.118.)

The letter explained

Mr. Thorne had been placed into the NICI Sex Offender Assessment Group (SOAG)
program, but he was initially sent to the Correction Alternative Placement Program
(CAPP) facility to wait for a bed in the SOAG program to become available. (PSI,
p.118.)
The letter stated “Mr. Thorne has received five substantiated Disciplinary Offense
Reports (DORs)” since his arrival at the CAPP facility. (PSI, p.118.) The letter listed
three Class C DORs Mr. Thorne had received: “Unauthorized Transfer of Property” on
November 18, 2015; “Disobedience to Orders” approximately two weeks later; and a
second “Disobedience to Orders” on January 31, 2016. (PSI, p.118.) The January
2016 Disobedience to Orders DOR was reportedly for Mr. Thorne “cheeking” his
medication and storing them in his cell, and Mr. Thorne “admitted to this behavior in the
DOR hearing.” (PSI, p.118.) However, the C-Note Summary attached to the letter did
not contain any C-Notes for November 18, 2015, late November or early December
2015, or January 31, 2016. (See PSI, pp.120-22.)
The letter also stated Mr. Thorne “received two Class A DORs; one for ‘Sexual
Assault/Battery’ (12/22/15), and the second for ‘Body Fluids’ (12/23/15).” (PSI, p.118.)
With respect to the Sexual Assault/Battery DOR, the letter stated, “[t]he body of the
DOR further notes that ‘Offender Thorne, in a written statement and interview, admitted
to exposing his genitals and attempting to place them against the face and head of
other offenders.’” (PSI, p.119.) However, the only C-Note for December 22, 2015 in the
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C-Note Summary merely stated, “no horseplay per c/o holloway at 22:20.” (PSI, p.121.)
Further, the C-Note Summary did not contain any C-Notes for December 23, 2015.
(See PSI, p.121.)
The C-Note Summary did reflect Mr. Thorne had his status changed to “SPL” on
December 31, 2015, and that he was released to IDOC custody and moved to NICI on
January 4, 2016. (PSI, p.121.) The earliest C-Note in the C-Note Summary mentioning
“the DORs received at the CAPP facility” was from January 22, 2016. (See PSI, p.120.)
Deputy Warden Lutz’s letter stated the DORs suggested “a significantly procriminal attitude and belief system.

Given the serious nature of these offenses,

including at least one of a sexual nature, it appears that Mr. Thorne is not an
appropriate candidate for the retained jurisdiction program at this time.” (PSI, p.119.)
The letter recommended the district court relinquish jurisdiction and execute
Mr. Thorne’s sentence. (See PSI, p.119.)
Three days after the date of Deputy Warden Lutz’s letter, the district court,
without conducting a rider review hearing, issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction.
(See R., pp.62-63.) The order stated:
The Court, having received and fully reviewed the letter and Addendum
Report dated February 16, 2016 from the Deputy Warden at North Idaho
Correctional Institution detailing serious disciplinary offenses committed by
the above named Defendant which occurred prior to placement at the
North Idaho Correctional Institute Sex Offender Assessment Group
program, and recommending this Court RELINQUISH JURISDICTION,
and Good Cause Appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the jurisdiction retained by the
Court pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2601(4) be, and is hereby,
RELINQUISHED.
(R., p.62 (emphasis in original).)
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Mr. Thorne filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order
Relinquishing Jurisdiction. (R., pp.64-68.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
Mr. Thorne asserts the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction in his case.

An appellate court reviews a district court’s decision to

relinquish jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648
(1998). The district court’s discretion in deciding whether to relinquish jurisdiction is not
limitless. State v. Rhoades, 122 Idaho 837, 837 (Ct. App. 1992).
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether
the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Thorne submits the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction because the allegations against him were not proven and his rider was over
before he had the chance to participate in appropriate programming. The district court
relinquished jurisdiction after reviewing Deputy Warden Lutz’s letter “detailing serious
disciplinary offenses committed by [Mr. Thorne] which occurred prior to placement at
the North Idaho Correctional Institute Sex Offender Assessment Group program.” (See
R., p.62.) However, the C-Note Summary attached to the letter did not corroborate the
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DORs reported in the letter. (See PSI, pp.118-22.) The C-Note Summary did not
include C-Notes for the reported November 18, 2015, late November or early December
2015, or January 31, 2016 Class C DORs, nor did it include C-Notes describing the
reported December 22 or December 23, 2015 Class A DORs. (See PSI, pp.118-22.)
While the letter stated Mr. Thorne had admitted to the January 31, 2016 Class C
DOR and the December 22, 2015 Class A DOR (PSI, pp.118-19), Mr. Thorne denies
the allegations. Further, the letter and attached C-Note Summary did not contain any
documentation of the hearing where Mr. Thorne reportedly admitted to the January 31,
2016 Class C DOR, or the interview and written statement where he reportedly admitted
to the December 22, 2015 Class A DOR. (See PSI, pp.118-22.)
The district court did not conduct a rider review hearing that would have provided
Mr. Thorne a chance to tell his side of the story. 2 (See R., pp.62-63.) Additionally,
because Deputy Warden Lutz submitted a letter “in place of” a full APSI (see PSI,
p.118), Mr. Thorne lost the opportunity to challenge the recommendation to relinquish
jurisdiction through a written response to the APSI. See also State v. Coassolo, 136
Idaho 138, 143 (2001) (“In order to make the system work, it is important for the district
court to have a report from the NICI on their assessment of the defendant’s conduct
while participating in the rider program. In the interest of fair judicial process, the district
judge should also receive in writing any response the defendant may choose to make
to the NICI recommendation.”) Also, Mr. Thorne’s retained counsel did not dispute the

Mr. Thorne recognizes the Idaho Supreme Court has held a participant in a rider
program does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest that would require a
hearing before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction. State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho
138 (2001).
2
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allegations or file an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to provide the district court with
additional information after the district court relinquished jurisdiction. (See R., pp.2-5
(register of actions).)

Thus, Mr. Thorne asserts the allegations against him were

not proven.
Mr. Thorne further asserts his rider was over before he had the chance to
participate in appropriate programming. Deputy Warden Lutz’s letter stated the letter
was sent in lieu of a full APSI “[g]iven that Mr. Thorne did not participate in a meaningful
program while on this retained jurisdiction.” (PSI, p.118.) Although the district court
recommended Mr. Thorne participate in sex offender treatment while on his rider
(R., p.58), the SOAG program at NICI had limited bed space and Mr. Thorne was sent
to the CAPP facility to wait for a bed to become available.

(PSI, p.118.)

The

psychosexual evaluation concluded Mr. Thorne “appeared to have a lower potential to
benefit from treatment at this time, indicating a low level of amenability.” (PSI, p.91.)
However, the psychosexual evaluation also observed “[t]hese concerns can be offset by
[Mr. Thorne] participating in treatment in a structured environment, which could
decrease the likelihood of treatment failure, supervision issues, and opportunity to utilize
substances.” (PSI, p.91.) Unfortunately, Mr. Thorne’s rider was over before he had the
chance to participate in such a structured environment or other appropriate
programming.
The allegations against Mr. Thorne were not proven, and his rider was over
before he had the chance to participate in appropriate programming. Thus, Mr. Thorne
submits the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Thorne respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction and remand the case for entry of an
order placing him on probation.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2016.

____________/s/_____________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of September, 2016, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JOEL SCOTT THORNE
INMATE #116988
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707
BRADLY S FORD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
___________/s/______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BPM/eas
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